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Abstract  
This paper proposes a new form of data 
communication that is similar to slang in human 
language. Using the context of the conversation 
instead of an encryption key, nodes in a network 
develop a unique alternative language to disguise the 
real meaning of the communication between them. 
Implementation of such a system, and its potential 
benefits and challenges are discussed.  
  
1. Introduction  
  
For all practical purposes, modern cryptography 
can be described as mathematics-based. In contrast this 
paper proposes a language-based cryptography and 
discusses how language-based cryptography might be 
implemented, reasons why it might be advantageous, 
and some challenges to practical implementation. 
After a brief background review, the proposed idea 
will be described, followed by some notes about 
practical implementation. Some benefits, challenges, 
and potential future uses and enhancements also will 
be presented.   
  
2. Background  
  
Recently newspaper and trade press articles have 
appeared with great frequency and quantity implying 
to the general public that current security policies and 
encryption methods may be insufficient to protect data 
communication. The need to disguise communication, 
particularly in this digital age, is well established and 
well documented.   
While math-based encryption generally has 
proven successful in widespread application, at least 
three eventualities credibly challenge that success. 
First, traditional threats, such as brute force and replay 
attacks, are not guaranteed to fail. Indeed, in the case 
of brute force attacks, they are guaranteed eventually 
to succeed. The probability of their success in the short 
term is low, but it is greater than zero, and over time 
increases to 1. The answer to this threat has been to use 
larger encryption keys. Also, as computing speed has 
increased in accordance with Moore’s Law; and 
because our preferred response seems to have been to 
use essentially the same technology only with larger 
numbers, we now are in a kind of arms race, hoping 
ever-larger encryption keys will withstand ever-faster 
computing power.  Is this strategy sustainable? [1]  
Second, in all keyed systems the secret is secure 
only so long as the key is secure. Therefore, even the 
strongest keyed encryption might be vulnerable to an 
unsophisticated phishing attack, for example.  
Third, quantum computing, once considered to 
be beyond the horizon, now appears to be 
forthcoming [2]. Machines that can do all the steps of 
a complex calculation at once have the potential to 
render our current math-based encryption schemes 
obsolete.  
  
2.1. Evolution of Modern Encryption  
  
The Oxford dictionary defines encryption as “the 
process of converting information or data into a code, 
especially to prevent unauthorized access.” [22] In this 
paper we more specifically define encryption as the 
reversible algorithmic process of scrambling clear-
text into an unreadable stream.  One of the early 
documented uses of encryption is the Caesar cipher, 
named after the Roman general Julius Caesar who was 
documented to use this method to communicate with 
his subordinates. A Caesar cipher is a type of 
substitution of characters with a shift of letters in a 
known position [3]. An example of this would be to 
shift each letter +3 positions in the alphabet so any 
letters “A” in the original message would become the 
letter “D” in the encoded version.  This is among the 
oldest known and documented forms of encryption  
[3].  
As communication methods between humans 
evolved so have the means of encryption.  Electronic 
communication began in the form of the telegraph. 
Wires were overtaken by radio waves and soon 
anybody with a quartz crystal could receive broadcast 
communications.  Encryption was needed, especially 
during wartime, to keep secrets from being directly 
overheard by the enemy. Perhaps the most famous of 
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wartime encryption was the Germans’ Enigma 
machine used in World War II [4].  This machine used 
a changing number of rotors that could be set to 
transpose the alpha characters. Each machine was 
capable of 17,576 combinations. This machine 
provided the supposed secure communication that the 
Axis powers needed to coordinate their methods. 
However, thanks to Alan Turing and associates, the 
Allied powers were able to break this code and thereby 
gain knowledge of the Axis powers’ communications. 
Another famous wartime example is the Navajo code 
talkers of World War II. [24]  
The Data Encryption Standard or DES is a 56-bit 
encryption standard developed by IBM in 1977 [5] at 
the behest of the National Bureau of Standards and was 
used primarily by the United States Government 
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. As computers 
became more powerful and able to conduct 
exponentially greater numbers of operations per 
second, DES was relegated to obsolete status because 
it was too easily and quickly broken. By 2000, the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) had supplanted 
DES as the de facto standard of encryption [6].  
As data communication evolved from wired to 
wireless, encryption again was needed to help keep this 
process safe from eavesdropping. The 802.11 standard 
included encryption [7]. This encryption protocol 
called Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was a method 
of scrambling the communication using a 40-bit key. 
As Arbaugh et al [7] pointed out, this method was 
quickly defeated and new, stronger standards were 
needed.   
One fundamental difficulty of these and other  
“symmetric” encryption methods is the needed secrecy 
of the key. Somehow, both sides of the communication 
need to have possession of the key while keeping it 
secret from all other parties.  
“Asymmetric” or “public private key encryption” has 
become the de facto solution for most modern 
encryption schemes. Public key or asymmetric key 
encryption was in development in the UK as early as 
1973 but finally declassified in 1997 [8]. Asymmetric 
encryption uses two keys: a publicly available one to 
encrypt and a different, privately held one to decrypt.   
New security measures, based on biometric tokens 
and other non-mathematical substitution schemes are 
now coming into practice. An example pertinent to this 
paper is the “Captcha” program, which takes 
advantage of something humans can do well, but 
computers do poorly – recognize characters in a 
distorted picture. This paper proposes a new process 
that we call Lingual Transformation-based encryption, 
or simply Lingual Transformation, which would apply 
a similar concept, protecting data via schemes at which 
computers are not inherently proficient. It would 
disguise communication by evolving the language 
used.    
  
2.2. Human language evolves over time  
  
Even without computers, humans often disguise 
their communication by introducing changes to their 
language, as in slang. Also, languages evolve over 
time. Generally, the changes that occur include 
spelling and pronunciation, the meaning of words 
and/or phrases, and additions/deletions in the lexicon. 
[9] Examples of evolutionary spelling changes can be 
seen in American versus British spellings of words like 
color (colour), and catalog (catalogue). Pronunciation 
differences can be observed between one time and 
another, as well as in regional differences. For 
example, the word “leisure” may rhyme with 
“treasure” or with “seizure”, often depending on the 
age of the person saying it. Lexical changes occur as 
new words come into widespread use (megabyte, 
snowboard, google) and old words fall into disuse 
(deliciate, aerodrome).    
Another way in which language changes is by 
development of slang. The difference in slang is that it 
often assigns different meanings to existing words. 
Although slang may have been used much earlier, 
“What we mean by English slang today didn’t really 
start until the 16th or 17th century in England. It 
developed out of what was then called the ‘thieves 
cant’, or the jargon developed by criminals. It’s 
estimated that perhaps only 10,000 people out of the 4 
million English speakers spoke the Thieves Cant, and 
its purpose originally was the same as all jargon – to 
be able to speak to each other without others knowing 
what they were saying” [10].   
In modern slang the meanings assigned to slang 
words often depend on the context in which they are 
spoken. In reference to a desired drink on a summer 
day, the word “cool” has a completely different 
meaning than when used in reference to a person who 
remains calm under stress.  Therefore, given a specific 
context, the words and phrases employed in a 
conversation may be understood differently, according 
to that context. Thus, “Skier slang is different from 
surfer slang, which is different from any other 
subgroups’ slang, and the only way to know it, is to be 
a part of that group” [11].  
  
2.3. The Problem  
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One major problem with modern cryptography is 
that keyed encryption remains vulnerable to different 
kinds of traditional attacks. Much of the threat against 
encrypted communication can be classified into three 
types [12]:  
1. Man in the middle  
2. Brute force  
3. Replay attack  
  
A man in the middle attack has the communication 
routed through a computer that is controlled by the 
attacker. The attacker copies the entire communication 
and then, based upon the captured key, may pretend to 
be the person at either end of the communication. This 
allows the attacker to access or change the data. This 
attack can be difficult to detect because after the 
attacker obtains the desired data, the message can be 
forwarded to the intended recipient, who presumably 
will have no clue the communication was intercepted.  
A brute force attack is when the attacker makes an 
unending attempt to guess the password or key needed 
to pretend to be the user. Given enough time and 
unlimited attempts, brute force will always be 
successful against math-based cryptography.  
A replay attack is when the attacker listens and 
records the communication stream. They then take this 
recorded stream and replay one side of it against the 
other side. This can lead to the attacked system 
replying with the missing key. This attack also may be 
difficult to detect because all aspects of the 
communication are copied from the original source, 
and therefore appear to be legitimate.   
In addition to these known attack vectors, another 
and ultimately more likely possibility is discovering 
the files or databases where secret keys are kept [12]. 
By password cracking or other means, the attacker 
obtains access to the files containing encryption keys 
and then has the ability to compromise security for all 
communication which relies on any of those keys. 
Further, theoretically random key generation in real 
implementation often is pseudo-random, which means 
potentially predictable [13].  
In recent history, a persistent challenge in 
mathbased encryption is represented by a corollary to 
Moore’s Law, which states that computing power (or 
calculations per unit of time) will double every 18 
months or so. This presents a problem to 
mathematically “unsolvable” decryption equations. As 
numbers of transistors in computer chips increase the 
time required to solve these mathematical equations 
decreases. Solving the equation is brute forcing the 
decryption of the data. Additionally, there are time-
saving factors such as rainbow tables to pre-generate 
solutions to the mathematical equations to inject into 
encrypted data tables [14]. Such methods can 
exponentially speed illicit access to encrypted data 
streams. In this vein, the apparently imminent advent 
of quantum computers [15] may pose a serious threat 
to all math-based encryption.  
Much current encryption depends on a key and 
proper key exchange facilitated by public key 
verification authorities [16]. Unfortunately, 
consolidated key verification also constitutes a single 
point of failure. If a user’s private key is decoded or 
stolen, any entity can claim to be that key holder. In 
the case of a key verification authority being 
compromised, the attacker then has access to all the 
root certificates. An example of this is the DigiNotar 
hack of 2011 [17].  
A question arises then, about whether keyed, 
math-based encryption really is the best we can do? 
Perhaps humans’ intelligent manipulation of language 
might serve as a different model for secure data 
communication. The following section explores ideas 
about mimicking human slang in data communication.  
  
3. Theoretical Propositions  
  
Slang consists, essentially, of substituting a 
“wrong” word in place of a right word, while 
conveying the right meaning. Drawing upon context, 
speakers and listeners can infer the right meaning in 
spite of saying or hearing the wrong word. Consider 
the following short conversation:  
Q: How did you like the movie? A: 
Oh, it was good.  
The answer, “it was good” would be understood 
by anyone steeped in American culture if the 
respondent had used any of the following words 
instead of “good”. Note that none of the words’ 
original meaning corresponds to “good”.  
  
 Swell  Hip  
 Hot  Bad  
       Cool     Groovy 
Radical    Sick  
    
Although at times slang has been considered 
vulgar and low, historically it seems to have been 
widely known and used [19]. With the goal of instilling 
the ability to create and use slang into computers, one 
might first attempt to model the way humans create 
and use slang. Extrapolating from the conversation 
above, a basic model would depict two participants, A 
and B, exchanging words via a communication 
medium (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1.  
  
Such a simplistic model clearly fails to capture the 
purpose of communication. A better model is shown in 
Figure 2.   
  
  
  
Figure 2.  
  
In Figure 2, A and B exchange meaning. Words 
constitute the medium by which they do so (“words” 
in this context are defined loosely to include any 
representation of meaning, whether by a string of 
characters or other representation.) Thus, A and B may 
choose from among many words in their respective 
vocabularies to convey a particular meaning (each 
arrow represents a possible word choice; the longer 
arrows represent the chosen words in Figure 3).   
  
  
  
  
Figure 3.  
  
In the models presented so far, the presence of a 
third entity, C, must be assumed as an illicit 
eavesdropper. As long as A and B use standard, 
accepted vocabulary to convey their meaning, C will 
have no problem understanding the same meaning.   
Under the model in Figure 3, slang can be defined 
simply as A and B agreeing on a new pathway (word) 
to convey a specific meaning, particularly if agreement 
can be reached without C’s participation. The only way 
A and B can reach such agreement is by reference to 
some context of which A and B are, but C is not, a part.   
Because use of slang is both a part of 
everyday language and a fact of history, arriving at the 
following is easy:  
  
Axiom 1: Humans, communicating within a 
specific context, can create and use slang words and/or 
phrases to convey meaning in a way that is, at least 
temporarily, unintelligible to others who are not 
participants in that context.  
  
The slang words may be new creations, invented 
specifically to convey meaning (e.g., “nerd”), or they 
may be existing words that are assigned new meaning 
(e.g., “swell”). In either case, no additional effort is 
required to disguise the communication – it can be 
spoken aloud in mixed company. Further, no 
restrictions exist on which words or phrases may be 
chosen, as long as A and B can agree on the assigned 
meaning. Thus, for example, even the word “bad” can 
be used as a term to express something desirable.  
While the models depicted in Figures 1-3 apply to 
human communication, they may also apply to 
computer communication. Viewing computer 
communication as an extension of human 
communication, logically:  
  
Proposition 1: Like humans, computing machines 
could achieve the same benefits communicating by 
slang created from their own context.  
  
Over time, however, the secretive purpose can be 
frustrated as slang words come into more widespread 
use and eventually are accepted into common 
language. The remedy, of course, is to update the slang 
lexicon frequently, thus staying ahead of eager but 
uninitiated would-be users. Thus:  
  
Axiom 2: Because slang is not guaranteed to 
remain arcane for long, human slang continuously 
evolves to meet the requirements of the users.  
  
Computers mimicking human slang use would 
face a similar challenge that any message “encrypted” 
by slang would soon be discovered as the slang words’ 
meaning would eventually become known. Therefore, 
the vocabulary used by communicating machines 
similarly must evolve. In human communication, 
language evolution takes time, and although evolution 
occurs, sometimes the meaning can still be understood 
as if the language had not changed. For example, 
Shakespearean language is still intelligible today 
despite obvious differences from modern English.   
In contrast, however, slang may evolve for 
expressly clandestine purposes. One requirement for 
successfully achieving such purposes is changing fast 
enough to keep ahead of unwanted users who try to 
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decipher the evolving slang. Of course, speed is one of 
the great strengths of modern computers. Therefore:  
  
Proposition 2: Computers can “compress” the time 
required for slang to evolve, thus rapidly and 
continuously changing their shared slang and 
consequently keeping outsiders – even fast ones – out.  
  
The value humans derive from creating and using 
slang lies in the ability to authenticate speakers as 
members of an exclusive group and/or to maintain a 
level of secrecy conversing with group members while 
in the presence of non-members. The goals of modern 
keyed encryption are almost identical. If computers 
can create their own slang, and if they can do it quickly  
enough to keep eavesdroppers flummoxed, then   
  
Proposition 3: Computer-generated slang can meet the 
same goals as modern encryption techniques.  
  
Of course, proving or disproving theoretical 
propositions such as these would be more than a simple 
matter of practical implementation. Extensive testing 
and real-world experience over time would also be 
necessary. However, the process must begin 
somewhere. The following section describes one way 
it might be accomplished.  
  
4. Implementation  
  
As described above, language evolves over time in 
several ways.  Natural evolution seems to occur along 
at least three dimensions [18]: the meaning of words, 
spelling and pronunciation, and additions and deletions 
in the lexicon. Purposely manipulating language to 
render it arcane could be done in the same three ways 
and also in other ways.  Word substitutions, based on 
any number of schemes from rhyming, to homonyms, 
to synonyms; spelling variations, based on phoneme 
disassembly/reassembly; and rearrangement of 
grammar are a few possibilities among a potentially 
very wide range of schemes [18]. Indeed, the 
substitutions need not follow any externally 
discernible method at all, as long as the 
communicating parties can agree on them. Choosing 
and combining such schemes in an unpredictable mix 
would create a unique “slang” that could only be 
understood by the entities that participated in making 
it.  
One crucial element for development of slang 
among groups of humans is context.  In order to create 
a type of slang that could be used between two data 
communication devices, some type of common context 
must be established.  The context must be unique and 
exclusive such that only the entities involved in the 
conversation are privy to the context. This makes an 
interesting challenge because of the necessary 
assumption that an eavesdropper is always listening.  
Some manipulations that could be employed to 
“evolve” a usable slang might include the same types 
of methods employed by humans in creating slang, like 
simply substituting context elements, or rhyming 
words, synonyms, purposeful misspellings, 
homonyms, or disassembling/reassembling phonemes. 
Of course, additional methods beyond those modeled 
by generations of humans, would be limited only by 
our ability to imagine and implement them.  The 
evolvable context of a flow of data between two 
devices could include any protocol-related exchanges, 
packet history, and/or some agreed-upon and mutually 
external elements. 
  
4.1. The All-Important Context  
The common context is the critical component of the 
system for several reasons. First, drawing from a 
common context eliminates the need to exchange an 
encryption key. The context gives the communicating 
nodes a common “pool” from which they can draw 
inferences about the intended meaning of “wrong” 
words sent and received to convey “right” meaning. 
This is important, for example, because traditional 
stream ciphers suffer from a potentially debilitating 
weakness: the key (called the seed) from which their 
keystream originates, supposed to be entirely random, 
in practice is often generated from internal computer 
states that are pseudorandom, i.e., potentially 
predictable. If a seed can be identified by an adversary, 
the adversary can decrypt any encrypted messages 
resulting from that seed [13]. An example of this 
problem is the untimely obsolescence of WEP 
encryption in early Wi-Fi implementations [21]. 
Drawing on a unique, common context eliminates the 
need for an encryption key.  
 The context facilitates another purpose beyond the 
being the basis for “encryption”. Because it is created 
exclusively by two communicating nodes, and is 
unique to just those two nodes, their conversation, and 
specific elements thereof (time, place, etc.), no other 
entity can correctly apply it. Therefore, proper 
application of the unique context serves as a means of 
authentication of the nodes involved.     
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4.2. The Process  
A process to create and use an exclusive slang 
between two nodes in a network would require the 
following steps:  
1. Given a need to communicate securely a 
message between two nodes in a 
communication network, begin by 
exchanging non-secure, inconsequential 
flows between the two nodes (ICMP 
commands, for example), keeping a log as the 
exchanges continue. The log may include any 
and all of the flow(s) exchanged between the 
two nodes, including protocol details (packet 
headings, time stamps, etc.) as well as 
message content.   
2. Using the log as a reference, agree on 
methods, possibly similar to the natural 
evolution of human slang, to effect 
substitutions for the individual words (or 
other subdivisions of the secure message).   
3. Apply the agreed-upon methods, 
transforming the original message into a 
series of words (or other subdivisions of the 
message) which, despite being transmitted in 
clear text, appear to constitute nonsense, or 
content in which an eavesdropper is not 
interested.  
4. Upon receipt, reverse the agreed-upon 
method to obtain the original message.  
  
Now apply these four steps to the process between 
every pair of communicating nodes in a network. As 
message content traverses a network, every node-node 
pair along the way would repeat the process, each time 
creating a new and unique context and using a different 
transformation method. While the “encryption” 
achieved at this point may appear to be a simple 
substitution cypher, it is important to note that no 
encryption key has been generated or exchanged. 
Further, every node-node pair along the 
communication pathway is using a different and 
unique “language.” Still, the meaning of the original 
message would be understood by each node.  
Therefore, the two terminal nodes (the original sender 
and the ultimate receiver), going through the chain of 
node-node pairs, must create their own unique context 
and choose their own transformation methods.  
  
Viewed from another perspective, Lingual 
transformation based encryption can be understood in 
the following way:   
Given a network consisting of several nodes, A,  
B, C, … Z, and assuming that when node A has a 
message for node Z, the message must be 
communicated through the intermediate nodes, B, C, 
etc., node A must communicate first with node B. 
Node B then communicates with node C in order to 
pass the message along on its path toward node Z. 
Node C then communicates with node D, and so on 
until the message arrives at node Z.   
With lingual transformation, nodes A and B first 
create their own unique language or slang, using the 
context of their conversation that is known only to A 
and B. We can refer to this language as AB language. 
Then, node B similarly establishes another, different 
new language with node C: BC language. Node C does 
similarly with node D, and so on until all of the node-
node pairs from A to Z have their own unique 
language. Finally, when the full chain of unique-
language-speaking node-node pairs has been 
established, node A communicates with node Z via the 
chain and creates yet another unique language, 
established between node A and node Z (AZ language) 
in the same manner as described for all the node-node 
pairs (see figure 4). After all these languages have been 
established, nodes A and Z can begin exchanging 
secret information. At this point, node A translates its 
secret message from human language to AZ language, 
then translates the result into AB language and sends it 
to node B. Lacking context (AZ context), Node B will 
not understand the message, but will translate it to BC 
language and send it to node C. Node C similarly will 
not understand the AZ-language message, but will 
translate it to CD language, and so forth.  
Throughout the duration of the conversation 
between node A and node Z, every node-node pair 
continuously modifies its language by reference to its 
continuously-changing common context. Nodes A and 
Z also continuously evolve their own unique language 
in the same way.  
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Figure 4.  
 
5. Benefits of Lingual Transformation 
Based Encryption  
  
This new method of computer communication 
functions as an encryption scheme as well as a 
potential one-time pad. This will reduce the risk of the 
three vectors of attack mentioned earlier: Man-in-the 
middle, brute force, and replay attack. It also 
eliminates the danger of stolen keys (because there are 
no keys to steal).    
A man-in-the-middle attack is only effective if the 
attacker can copy the data and extract the cleartext. The 
only conversation that the attacker can capture is 
between only two nodes in the chain. These two nodes 
(pick any communicating pair) are only speaking their 
version of slang. The actual conversation between 
nodes A and Z appears as nonsense to C and D, for 
example, because it is conducted in a language (AZ 
language) they don’t know. However, C and D 
translate and pass on the “nonsense” words into their 
language (CD language) which when “decrypted” still 
would be in a language unknown to anyone except A 
and Z.  
The use of Brute Force would be irrelevant as 
there is no password or key to brute force out of the 
conversation. Agreeing on a transformation method is 
not equivalent to sharing a key, just as agreeing to 
speak French is not equivalent to giving a specific 
password. Even if one element of the conversation 
could be deciphered, the other elements would not be 
compromised because each is “encrypted” differently. 
A replay attack would be foiled by the fact that all of 
the languages employed are continuously evolved, 
effectively creating a one-time pad. An attacker would 
gain nothing by replaying a recorded conversation as 
the conversation is either dropped or evolved beyond 
the limit of the replayed recording.  
Of course, other threats also exist that are not 
solvable by encryption because they involve attacking 
static data, human users, or operating systems. Since 
social engineering involves attacks on the human user 
and not on the data, encryption of any kind is irrelevant 
against it. A port scan or vulnerability attack is a server 
side attack and not a conversation attack therefore this 
proposed encryption method will have little effect on 
reducing any threat via port scan.  Denial of service 
attack also does not have anything to do with 
encryption and therefore any method of encryption 
will not reduce this attack vector. Any attack on the 
physical computer is also not defensible by 
communication-based encryption [12].  
The scheme described in this paper successfully 
would improve the defense against the methods of 
attack which target weaknesses in encryption. These 
results would help any type of computer 
communication be more effective in keeping the 
secrets secure.   
  
6. Challenges   
  
Two major challenges immediately become 
apparent with lingual transformation-based 
encryption. The first is the time necessary to establish 
context in order to morph computer language into an 
unrecognizable quasi-slang. In addition to the original 
establishment of the context, the need for continual 
updates will also prove time-consuming. Along with 
the context, the actual lexicon of the unique language 
also must evolve. Of course, the speed at which 
computers operate will greatly compress the time 
needed to evolve language compared to humans; 
nonetheless there will be a time lag.  Bandwidth is a 
related concern due to the amount of overhead data 
exchange required to establish unique slangs before 
secrets can be shared. 
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The second challenge lies in the actual methods 
for morphing language. In addition to contributing to 
the time problem, the potential complexity of creating 
a new language on the fly will likely be challenging.  
While historically, language evolution takes time, 
slang develops more quickly by substituting new 
words or changing the meaning of existing words. The 
easiest substitutions would probably come directly 
from the context, but other substitution might be more 
secure. A system might instead use context elements 
as “menu choices” for other methods of substitution. 
Some possible methods are listed:  
• Rhyming words:   
• Synonyms   
• Antonyms  
• Homonyms   
• Cockney Rhyming Slang  
• Phoneme deconstruction/reconstruction   
• Language translation  
• Quasi-random replacement  
  
The greater number of methods used, the more robust 
lingual transformation based encryption will become. 
Slang is apparently a universal human language 
concept. [23] We envision a constant and ongoing 
quest for new methods. The methods above focus only 
on changing the vocabulary and no other characteristic 
of language. Other possible areas to search for 
manipulation methods might include: spoken language 
(including voice pitch, speed, and pronunciation), 
purposeful and meaningful misspellings, and grammar 
(including sentence structure).   
  
7. Future Uses  
  
As this technology emerges and evolves, ideas about 
future uses include, but certainly are not limited by, the 
following.  
• Morphing data within a single computer. 
Using the internal I/O of the computer, this 
method could be built into the controllers 
themselves to encrypt the data stored on the 
hard drive.  
• Creating an ad-hoc network in a company’s 
DMZ to force an enhanced language 
morphed network communication, thus 
ensuring that language morphing is 
occurring. This technique would help keep 
the technology future-proof. By adding nodes 
to the system the morphed language gets 
more complicated and morphed. Adding 
system after system would force subsequent 
attacks to keep up with similar resources.  
• Keeping records of previously created 
morphed languages to use as digital 
fingerprints. Each node to node 
communication could be logged and stored. 
Once logged computers could identify 
themselves based upon that previous, and 
unique communication. This could speed up 
future communications with same devices.  
• As quantum computers are created and 
brought to market, this method, due to its lack 
of math, can still be used to protect secret 
messages. Quantum computers create serious 
problems for math-based encryption. Lingual 
transformation-based encryption uses the 
communication as the basis for morphing 
rather than an exchanged key or known 
algorithm.   
  
8. Summary  
  
In this paper we have put forward the theoretical 
proposition that the benefits of human slang use could 
be effectively realized in data communication by 
applying similar principles. Humans routinely 
manipulate standard language to achieve purposes like 
authentication and secure communication. Computers 
might just as well emulate that behavior. Some 
important features of a practical implementation of this 
idea are:  
• Keyless encryption, eliminating the need for 
safe storage and exchange of encryption keys.  
• Continuous evolution, essentially creating a 
one-time pad.  
• Non-math logic, allaying concern about the 
threat of quantum key cracking.  
  
Some additional benefits include:  
• Greatly increased effort required for attackers 
to compromise large numbers of records 
(because the language continually morphs, a 
successful breach would yield only a small 
amount of data).  
• Automatic authentication and compromise 
detection (because communication is based 
only on the exact common context of the two 
nodes involved – the very presence of a third 
party alters the context, and therefore is 
detectable).  
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• A new method that diverges from the “arms 
race” (bigger and bigger key sizes) way of 
protecting data communication.  
  
Of course, a healthy skepticism is appropriate when an 
unproven idea is advanced. Naturally many questions 
about proposed benefits remain until a practical 
implementation can provide answers. The following 
list is representative of some objections that might be 
raised:  
• This is no better than a simple substitution 
cypher.  
• A trained and/or experienced linguist could 
easily crack the code.  
• An eavesdropper at the terminal node would 
know everything the terminal node knows.  
  
Addressing such concerns is more than a matter of 
debate. These and other concerns will require thorough 
proving through rigorous testing (which is underway, 
but without reportable results as of this writing). 
However, with careful consideration of this list we 
observe:  
• Ultimately all encryption is substitution. 
However, this idea is different from other 
methods because   
o there is no key exchange; o while 
the terminal nodes participate in 
lingual transformations with their 
immediate neighbors, they remain 
unaware of the other 
transformations between them;  
o the transformations are performed 
continually, so the encryption 
evolves as the conversation 
continues. If an eavesdropper could 
decipher the encryption, he would 
almost immediately have to do it 
again;  
o the communication between nodes, 
for example in BC language, CD 
language, DE language, etc. consists 
of translations from AZ language. 
An eavesdropper who deciphers one  
of the languages would still have to 
decipher AZ language (then return 
to the 3rd point, above)   
• The linguist would have to be quick, and 
his/her work continuous. In any case, if the 
language were deciphered, the breach would 
consist of one communication unit (word, 
packet, record), not tens of millions as in 
contemporary breaches. Additionally, as the 
data entering any given node has already been 
substituted with a different language, the 
original data can only be translated at the 
terminal nodes.  
• The presence of an eavesdropper at a terminal 
node indicates a lapse in all types of security.  
Any security/encryption method will 
eventually be breached if an attacker has 
access to the terminal data node.  
  
  
9. Conclusion   
  
There will always be a need for secret 
communication to be kept from prying eyes and ears. 
Harking back to Julius Caesar, the need to keep secrets 
has always been at the forefront of military, 
government, corporate and other private operations. 
Because opposing entities will always attempt to 
discover important secrets, we always will have a need 
to create new and better ways of keeping our 
communication safe. Language-morphing techniques 
will contribute to the evolution of keeping secrets.  
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